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SOCIAL ROLES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY:
A CONFUCIAN-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY HYBRID
ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL IDENTITYAND ONTOLOGY
SAMMUEL BYER

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I delineate a variety of questions related to personal identity and
ontology. I develop and compare the Confucian conception of the person and the view of the
person developed throughout Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity and ontology. I will
demonstrate that the Confucian conception of the person has numerous instructive similarities
with Parfit’s work on personal identity, despite a number of differences. I argue, briefly, that
this project is worthwhile as a piece of comparative philosophy. One of the final two sections
of the paper develop a new hybrid account of personal identity and ontology that combine the
Confucian and Parfitian views of personal identity and personal ontology. The last section of
the paper goes into detail developing this view in response to potential questions, and responds
to some objections to this hybrid account, including objections based on a similarity between
the Confucian account and the narrative account of personal identity.
Keywords: Confucian, Kong Zi (Confucius), narrative theory of personal identity, Parfit,
personal identity, personal ontology, psychological continuity, role-persons, the self

1. INTRODUCTION
Personal identity is a messy topic in philosophy. This messiness is due to the many
ways that the concept is used. It is of central importance for most human endeavors to
have some answer to the question “What is a person?” This is a question about what
sort of thing persons are – a specific kind of object or substance, say, or a process, or a
set, or a composite of objects, substances, processes, or sets. Call this the question of
personal ontology.
In Western philosophical traditions, nearly every answer to this prior question also
gives us some answer to the following question “If a person is the same, in virtue of
what feature are they the same?” In other words, what features must remain the same
in order for some person at time t1 to be identical to some person at time t2? Even the
________________________
BYER, SAMMUEL R.: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Fort Hays State University, USA.
Email: srbyer@fhsu.edu

Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)

BYER

2

concept of identity involved in this question needs further clarification. Usually,
theorists mean to hold views about numerical identity as opposed to qualitative identity.
The question of numerical identity is whether a given entity is exactly one-and-thesame entity. The question of qualitative identity is whether an entity is the same
qualitatively, but not literally, exactly, or numerically. As an example, the shirt I am
wearing will be the same shirt even if it loses some qualitative properties (e.g. if it is
bleached and changes color, or becomes worn and gets a hole in it, or the tactile
sensations it gives rise to change after several washings). On the other hand, if I
purchased two shirts that are identical, they would be qualitatively identical insofar as
they would have all of the same qualitative features (e.g. made of the same material,
being the same size and shape, being the same color, having the same level of softness,
sporting the same design on the left breast pocket, etc), despite the fact that they are
clearly not the same object. Further complicating this issue is whether the identity
sought is diachronic (over time) or synchronic (in a given instant or moment). In
general, most views on the nature of personal identity are concerned with diachronic,
numerical identity of persons. To rephrase the initial formulation of this question, we
can ask “If a person is numerically the same object throughout time, in virtue of what
feature are they numerically the same object throughout time?” Call this the persistence
question of personal identity.1 Although these are distinct questions, it has been easy to
confuse the two since an answer to one is very likely to have implications for what can
count as a suitable answer to the other (Olson 2007).
A final matter is distinguishing between the question just asked regarding personal
identity and a related, but distinct question. When thinking about what makes someone
(loosely, or metaphorically) the same person throughout time in terms of their
characteristic, distinctive, most salient properties, we are not simply looking for an
answer to either of the previous two questions. We are looking for a different sort of
answer altogether. The answer we’re looking for will be similar to an answer to the
question “Who am I really?” asked after an existential crisis, a traumatic event, a slow
change in one’s personality, and in other contexts. Call this the characterization
question of personal identity, following Schechtman 2017 and Olson and Witt 2018.
This paper is an exploration of the accounts of numerical, diachronic personal
identity and personal ontology held by both Kong Zi (孔子) and Derek Parfit, that
answers the persistence question.2 Kong Zi and the early ru-ists held a conception of
the self as dynamic, changing, based entirely on their social roles and relationships with
other people. 3 Derek Parfit, in certain writings, held a view of personal ontology

1

Though this is also called the reidentification question, I follow Olson and Witt 2018 in referring to it
as the persistence question, for reasons they outline.
2
At least, I take it to be the case that each of the answers considered will answer both questions. In
considering objections to the hybrid view, I consider an objection related to this nest of questions.
3
Ames 1991a, 1991b, 1994, 2010, Ames and Rosemont 2016, Bockover 2010a and 2010b, Kim 2011,
Hansen 1985, Hall and Ames 1987, Ho 1995, Raphals 2009, Rosemont Jr. 1991, and Yao 1996 either
define the Confucian view in these social and relational terms, or use this analysis as a springboard for
other philosophical endeavors, while an examination of this view of the self in relation to grief and
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requiring we are the thinking parts of human beings, the persistence of which requires
Relation R, defined as psychological connectedness and/or continuity (in Parfit 1971,
1984, 1995, and 2012). Of course, the most interesting thesis held by Parfit is that even
in the absence of identity, we might care about those future persons distinct from, but
related to, our current selves.
In the final section of the paper, I develop a hybrid Confucian-Parfitian Account of
both numerical, diachronic personal identity and personal ontology, the hybrid
account’s insight into the unimportance of personal identity, and explain some potential
advantages of such an account. I answer several questions in order to clarify the
commitments of the account and consider and respond to some objections to this hybrid
account.
In this paper, I will review the answers of both adherents of Confucianism and
psychological continuity theory, including Parfit, to these questions. I will argue that
in certain specific and important ways, Kong Zi’s and Parfit’s views are similar. I will
give reasons as to why I take this comparative project to be of philosophical value.
Finally, I propose a hybrid account that combines the insights of both Kong Zi and
Parfit, and respond to some objections to this account.
2. EXAMPLES
In order to flesh out the differences and similarities in the views I consider below, it
will behoove us to set out some specific, detailed example cases. This will allow us to
see, in application, what these judgments about persons and personal identity amount
to for a general psychological continuity theory, Parfit’s views about the unimportance
of identity, and Kong Zi and his contemporary interpreters.
2.1

JOHN’S CASE

Over his lifetime, John has made many friends, as an outgoing elementary school
teacher. John has only been married once, to Martha, and they have one child, Jim.
John is a faithful, devout husband and a caring and loving father. The relationships
between he and his wife, and he and his son, stay largely the same throughout their
lives, despite minor bumps and issues here and there. Martha passes away in her sleep
when John is in his 60’s. This saddens him deeply, but he still maintains a positive,
emotionally rich relationship with his son Jim. In his late 60’s, John begins to have
concerning memory lapses, and is diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. At 75, John’s
Alzheimer’s disease has advanced significantly. Now in a care facility, John rarely
remembers his wife or son. When Jim comes to visit, John feels fear, anguish, and
hostility towards him (or, at times, at John’s own fragmented understanding of the
situations and persons he finds himself involved with). Jim finds this heartbreaking –
to see the man that was so loving and kind to him reduced to this state, unable to
memory occurs in Olberding 1997, and Wang 2002 develops a relatively recent analysis of different
conceptions of the Confucian view of the self and an argument for a new model.
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remember Jim’s childhood, or Martha’s laughter, is devastating. Jim also finds his
father’s behavior especially hard to deal with when John is angry, mean, and aggressive,
qualities that were rarely expressed at all prior to the Alzheimer’s diagnosis. After
several particularly nasty and violent interactions, Jim angrily renounces his father and
will have nothing further to do with him beyond paying to maintain his current level of
care, despite his disease and John’s role in Jim’s life as his father. Jim stops visiting
John, mentally characterizes John as being a remnant of the prior person he was, and
no longer thinks of him as his father.
2.2

ISABELLA’S CASE

Isabella has always been described as outgoing. A nursing assistant, she is garrulous
and wild, the life of the party in any social situation. As a teenager and through her 20’s,
Isabella leads a relatively hedonistic, partying lifestyle, and this matches up with her
explicit, chosen values – as an example, for her nursing itself is less about caring for
others, and more about being a job she sort of fell into. Isabella would describe herself
as having many acquaintances, but few friends, and her relationship with her family is
complicated. Her relationship with her only living relative, her mother Gladys, is not
very good during this period of her life, most of the time there is almost no relationship
at all. This is the result of both Isabella’s character, as well Gladys’. Isabella is largely
cold, dismissive, or even abusive towards her mother, when she is around her. On the
other hand, Gladys has been both a doting, caring mother for periods of time, and an
absent, uncaring figure in her daughter’s life in others. Isabella undergoes a spiritual
transformation in her 30s, and changes her life and personality in significant,
considerable ways. She stops drinking, using drugs, and partying, and undergoes
intense, lengthy personal reflection on her values, how she wants to live, and what
makes a life worthwhile. Deciding to live in concert with her newly acquired and
chosen values, she begins attending church and recalibrating her understanding of her
work as a nursing assistant to be geared toward caring for others who need medical
help and attention. Socially, her life changes a great deal. Almost all of her previous
friendships, as well as her periodic romantic entanglements, which survived for so long
due to comparable values and activities, wither and die. Her relationship with her
mother changes in a unilateral way. Isabella is determined to be a good, loving, filial
daughter to her mother with regularity, not only on occasion, and so makes every effort
to get reacquainted with her mother. For Gladys’ part, little changes; she is still
sometimes loving and dutiful, and other times absent and disconnected. Isabella’s
spiritual transformation takes – the remainder of her life is spent developing her
virtuous nature, deepening her spiritual relationship, focusing on her career working
through different levels of nursing in order to care for the ill and the broken, and trying
desperately to be a good, loving daughter. As Isabella gets older, it becomes
increasingly difficult for her to even understand the behaviors and motivations of her
younger self, including the younger self’s values and characteristics, much less evaluate
them the same way or endorse them. Until the end of her mother’s life, Isabella’s
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character remains constant and she maintains as solid a relationship with her mother as
the woman allows.
2.3

MOHSEN’S CASE

Mohsen’s life is almost defined by a series of monogamous romantic relationships.
Married four times, and divorced in each case after a serious, years-long relationship,
Mohsen is a strict serial monogamist who never lets these relationships have
overlapping boundaries. It is not that he doesn’t take romantic relationships seriously,
but that he is unlucky in love. Each of his partners genuinely enjoy their time with him,
but they ultimately come to some irreconcilable difference in the marriage, in value,
lifestyle, etc. or they grow apart and decide to end the marriage mutually. Raised only
by his father, his turn away from Islam to live a secular life at 18 resulted in his father’s
disowning him irrevocably. Mohsen never has any children from any of his marriages,
other relationships, or through his own individual efforts (e.g., adoption). He has
several close friends, but over time most of these fade with one exception. Throughout
his life, Mohsen’s general character and values remain largely the same as they were
at 18, with some relatively minor changes. He retains a clear memory and psychological
character throughout the remainder of his life, suffering from no illnesses or injuries
that affect his value, outlook, or memory. At 50, Mohsen passes away suddenly in a
freak traffic accident.
2.4

ZIWEI’S CASE

Ziwei (紫微) is a filial, respectful child. Her parents, Hong (洪) and Bao (包), have a
deep, abiding connection to her and are upright, moral, and loving parents. Throughout
her young life, Ziwei is slowly developing into a virtuous young woman. She begins to
develop these virtues in a particularly Confucian way – with a focus on ritual and social
etiquette, coupled with disciplined attempts to ensure the right emotions and
motivations are at the root of the actions she takes, and repetitive training to make these
virtues second nature. At 17, Ziwei is tragically injured in a hiking excursion. The brain
injuries she suffers result in both severe retrograde and anterograde amnesia. Ziwei
does not remember much of the autobiographical details of her past and is unable to
form new memories. She remembers her Confucian training, and the importance of
roles, relationships, and the attitudes that are supposed to govern them, but does not
remember who her mother and father are until they tell her. When they tell her, she
tries her hardest to act filially towards them, but she often needs reminding. While her
memory of these things is an acute problem, the roots of virtue remain in her character.
For her part, when Ziwei is reminded that she attempts to act filially towards her parents
and cultivate the appropriate attitudes and motivations, for brief and intermittent
stretches of time where she knows her parents. Her parents are deeply grieved in this
situation but take their parental roles seriously. During the next several years, they
gently remind her of their familial bonds frequently, care for her well-being, and make
every effort to treat her brain injury and the conditions associated with it. She is, after
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all, their little girl. After 12 years, much of Ziwei’s autobiographical memory returns.
Shortly after this, she begins to be able to make new memories. Overjoyed, her parents
try to fill her in on the details of the last 12 years with little success. Since Ziwei was
unable to form new memories for most of this time period, there is a significant gap in
the chain of her memories. She knows, for example, how the family celebrated her 20th
birthday, but only abstractly, from the reports of her parents. Despite this difficult
circumstance, Ziwei continues to receive treatment to deal with this gap in her memory
and continues to develop her virtues more and more thoroughly. For the rest of her
parents’ lives, she is a filial child who makes them proud.
3. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ONTOLOGY IN KONG ZI AND PARFIT
In this section, I will give a short summary of both the Confucian view of personal
identity and Parfit’s psychological continuity account of personal identity, as well as
his discussion on whether this matters. For each of these two views, I will identify what
features, if any, are determinative or constitutive of a person at a given point in time.
3.1

CONFUCIAN PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ONTOLOGY

There are several competing models of the Confucian concept of the self or person.4
This paper does not try to make any arguments for the superiority or inferiority of one
or another of the different models. Instead, this analysis will presume that something
like the relational model explained in Ames 1991, 1994 and 2004, and Rosemont Jr.
1991 is correct. To go further, any Confucian model of the self where a person’s
identity is defined, at a given moment, entirely by their social roles, relations, and their
quality, will be consistent with this analysis. Various competing models usually include
the centrality of particular, concrete social relations (and their character) in determining
the self, even if they conceive of the relations in slightly different, but apparently
important, ways. As long as a person’s identity at a given moment is entirely constituted
by social roles, relations, and their quality, then I believe what I have to say here will
not miss the mark.5
On this view, what defines a person at a moment are their social roles and relations,
and their quality. These roles and the relations necessarily connected to them include
those associated with one’s family, educational process, profession, and other personal
relationships (friends and lovers). Historically, the most important relationships for
personal development and constitution were the five relationships: parent-child, ruler-

4

While the terms “self” and “person” are not strictly the same, here I will use them to be relatively
interchangeable, and to use these accounts to be focused primarily on giving a numerical, diachronic
account of personal identity, personal ontology, and to answer the persistence question.
5
For example, every model in Ames 1994 with the exception of the Hollow Men would be able to
incorporate the essentially social and relational nature of the person in Confucianism. The same is true
for every model offered in Wang 2002, with the exception of the Universal Self model, and for every
Confucian model offered in Raphals 2009.

Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)

BYER

7

subject, serious romantic partners6, older sibling-younger sibling, and friends. However,
it is plausible to think that the importance of certain relationships has to do with their
function, as opposed to their genetic linkage, and contemporary developments of
Confucianism often recognize this.7 Even Kong Zi himself seems to recognize this as
related to the development of the doctrine of the rectification of names (zheng-ming 正
名) – both Analects 6.25 and 17.11 suggest that a ruler not acting as a ruler is not,
properly, labeled a ruler (and so on), and the focus on this functional aspect of social
roles is captured in Analects 12.11 as well.
As a personal example, at the time of writing this I occupy the roles of teacher to
my students, student to my teachers, advisee to my advisors, brother to my sister, son
to my mother, nephew to my aunt, friend to my friends, lover to my lover, etc. In each
case, these social relations can (and for their being valuable, must) be described even
more particularly, as concrete relationships between specific individuals; that I am a
brother to Sally, that I am a teacher to Hannah, that I am a student of Linda, that I am
a friend of Adipat, etc. This entire combination of roles I play (teacher, student, son,
and so on) and the particular relata are what determines my identity. It is not simply
that I am a brother, or a son, or a friend, but that I embody those roles towards specific
persons that constitute my identity.
The other important part is the quality of those relations, primarily because in order
for me to play a certain role, I have to be playing it minimally well (Ivanhoe 2007).
Because of teaching style or personality or other particulars my relationship as a teacher
to my students might be of a different quality in different cases (try as I might, it may
just be the case that my own style and the learning style of some students are
incompatible, and if they are my students then I will, at least, not be a good teacher to
them). I have been, at times, a better and worse friend to the same friend, or a better
and worse son to the same parent. In each of these cases, the qualities of these
relationships play a role in determining my identity. Furthermore, both the existence of
particular relationships and their quality are not static, but dependent on attitudes,
actions, behaviors, events, and various other features of those people and situations
involved. When significant changes in the quality of a relationship, or the dissolution
of a relationship entirely occur, these can change who one is, one’s personal identity.
On this view, when my last surviving parent dies, I will no longer be a son. When, at
an earlier stage of my life, I was married and then, later, divorced, I embodied a new
6

Generally, the tradition treats this relationship as the husband-wife relationship, but I do not see any
reason to think that persons in homosexual relationships, or those who oppose the formal arrangement
of marriage but are heterosexual long-term romantic partners, cannot also have the relevant depth and
significance in their romantic relationships that constitute and deeply affect their personhood and their
personal development, which is why I’ve modified the phrasing. I believe this is consistent with how
contemporary interpreters of Kong Zi often change the initially phrased relationship from “father-son”
to “parent-child” or the “older brother-younger brother” relationship to “elder sibling-younger sibling.”
However, for sake of ease, all example cases where romantic relationships take on importance involve
the formal marriage arrangement, though in those cases, the gender and sexual orientation of the
individuals is not always specified.
7
For example, see the discussion of what counts as a parent in Ivanhoe 2007, footnote 20.
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role of husband and then lost that role. On the Confucian relational view of personal
identity, when my roles are removed or added, or changed in significant ways, I am
literally a different person. A very well-known statement of this comes from an essay
by Henry Rosemont Jr., who writes “… for Confucius, I am my roles. Taken
collectively, they weave, for each of us, a unique pattern of personal identity, such that
if some of my roles change, others will of necessity change also, literally making me a
different person,” (Rosemont 1991, p. 90)
A key insight here is that the social roles we inhabit and that, for a Confucian,
comprise our identity, are social. They affect, and are affected by, others and their
views of us. These, in turn, are affected by the roles we inhabit. As a partner to Brittney,
I am known by her friends, family, and acquaintances in this way. They recognize me
specifically as a person who fulfills that role. The same goes for my familial relations.
Sally’s friends, in-laws, and husband know me primarily as her older brother. Anne’s
friends, coworkers, gym acquaintances, and gardening buddies know of me as her son.
Paul’s wife, his children, and his parents and siblings all conceive of me and know me
as his good friend. On a Confucian view, these relationships and the roles I inhabit with
respect to them have differing degrees of importance. Returning to the five
relationships introduced earlier, in our contemporary lives we see the importance of at
least most of these. It is hard to know what to say about the ruler-subject relationship
in our modern context. However, other of these important relationships are of
considerable significance even 2000 years removed from Kong Zi’s discussion of their
importance. The role of parents in affecting a child’s identity and self-development is
now a well-confirmed finding in social and developmental psychology as discussed in
Feldman 2018. Parents, for their part, often explain the experience of having children
as one of the most rewarding and life-changing experiences on offer, and even after
children leave the home the parental role is important for the parent’s sense of wellbeing as discussed in White and Edwards 1990. This is true of sibling well being and
development as well, as reviewed in Dunn 2002, and there is increasing contemporary
philosophical literature on the importance of friendship, reignited by Elizabeth Telfer
in Telfer 1970, and continuing forward since as the essays in Badhwar 1993 and Caluori
2013 show. I do not take any of this to establish that Kong Zi’s view is correct, but we
now have more confirmation than ever of the importance of our social roles and
relationships, especially four of the five classical Confucian relationships, with respect
to our well-being and our personality formation. This is consistent with and supportive
of the Confucian view of the significance of these relationships for our personal identity.
As said by a philosopher in another tradition, “A man who is incapable of entering into
partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state,
so that he must be either a lower animal or a god,” (Aristotle, Politics, 1253a20 – 30).
Andrea Sauchelli, in Chapter 3 of Sauchelli 2018, has developed a thoughtful and
clear schema for disambiguating different ways we might understand this kind of
general Confucian claim about the importance of social relationships for personal
identity. In terms of Confucian personal identity, Sauchelli gives the following
definition.
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Confucian Role Personal Identity: For all times t, person P at t1 is one and the same person
as person Q at t2 if and only if P at t1 is constituted by the same social roles R that constitute
Q at t2, and such roles are those prescribed in the rites of the early Confucian tradition.
(Sauchelli 2018, 87)

Sauchelli rightly notes that a very strict reading of this would imply that persons
only existed during a brief time and place in history; during the times when and
locations where individuals had these roles as described by the early Confucian
tradition. For my purposes, I believe that the following tweak of his schema captures
the model I’m proposing, allows a broader reading of the applicability of the Confucian
insights about important relationships, and fails to imply that most humans that have
existed were not persons. The tweak involves two changes. One is the addition of the
term ‘specific’ to modify ‘social roles’ in the definition, given what I’ve argued above
regarding the importance of specific roles (e.g. that I’m Anne’s son, not simply a son)
to the Confucian conception of personal identity. The other is to modify the final claim
about the early Confucian tradition, so that it is still tight enough to retain the important
insights from the tradition about social relationships for our identity, but loose enough
to allow both historical and contemporary persons not explicitly in Confucian contexts,
or that might not use these exact concepts, to count as persons and to have criteria of
personal identity.
Confucian-Inspired Role Personal Identity: For all times t, person P at t1 is one and the
same person as person Q at t2 if and only if P at t1 is constituted by the same specific social
roles R that constitute Q at t2, and such roles are inspired by the works of early Confucians
and the rites of the early Confucian tradition.

This modification can also give us an insight into the Confucian account of rolepersonal ontology. On this view, human beings or individuals are not persons, but
instead are the kinds of entities that could become persons if other relational conditions
occur. Like Parfit, the Confucian account suggests that we are not human beings, but
instead, as Ames would have it, “situated, relational human becomings who grow and
realize themselves as distinctive persons through a sustained commitment to their
always-collaborative, transactional roles with the nexus of family and community,”
(Ames 1991b, quoted in Sauchelli 2018, p. 85). Further, Sauchelli describes persons as
“being constituted by social relations”, which implies a distinction between human
beings or human individuals and persons. In a way that might be similar to other
constitution views about persons, Confucian role-person views might be thought to be
similar to other kinds of constitutions views of persons, like that from Baker 2016.
However, instead of a body constituting an essentially embodied, first person
perspective, a Confucian constitution view might require that persons are constituted
by specific social roles and relations, which are themselves dependent upon certain
physical and psychological facts about creatures like us.
This is why it is important to recognize that there are a variety of necessary
preconditions for social roles and relationships, including the five relationships of the
early Confucian tradition. In order for me to be a good parent, I must be capable of love,

Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)

BYER

10

affection, wisdom, righteousness, and many other character traits and virtues. I must
have certain psychological capacities to be a parent, or a child, insofar as roles are
multidirectional, collaborative things that affect, and are affected by, others. The
existence of my body in a persistent vegetative state would be entirely without these
capacities or my ability to inhabit those roles. Insofar as role-person accounts require
the individuals to be able to inhabit roles and practice specific virtues to inhabit them
well, and that require roles that are multidirectional and not simply passive, it will
require that we have the capacities to develop virtues and all that this entails, including
beliefs, emotions, motivations, and action.
This feature of the Confucian ontology of persons is mutually reinforced by the
focus in the early Confucian tradition on moral development and the psychology of
human individuals in Confucianism. The importance of the heart-mind (xin 心)for our
moral development, as well as our general cognitive capacity of self-reflection, is
expressed in any number of written texts in early Confucianism. In order to develop
our virtues, we must act the right way, for the right reasons, accompanied by the right
kinds of emotions, and ultimately, these acts should be second nature and not require
near as much deliberate, conscious effort. There is simply no way to develop virtue as
human animals are currently constituted without a great deal of self-reflection, teaching
received from others, discipline, and training. Most of these preconditions of the
development of virtue will require that we possess fairly robust cognitive and emotional
capacities.
This is not unrelated to our relationships. Plausibly, a major part of what it is to be
a filial child is to develop the virtue of filial piety (xiao 孝). So not only is our set of
psychological and emotional capacities required for the development of our virtues, but
they are also required in having full relationships with others. As Michael Puett and
Christine Gross-Loh argue in Puett and Gross-Loh 2016, conceiving of oneself as a
person with a set of roles is an important part of our moral development, and the
development of our moral virtue is an important part of fulfilling those specific roles
we inhabit with respect to others in our lives.
3.2

PARFITIAN PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ONTOLOGY

Parfit’s early view, taken primarily from Parfit 1971 and 1984 is that a person is nothing
over and above a collection of physical and psychological particulars at any given
moment (including brains and bodies).8 Parfit says “The existence of a person, during
any period, just consists in the existence of his brain and body, and the thinking of his
thoughts, and the doing of his deeds, and the occurrences of many other physical and
mental events,” (Parfit 1984, p. 275). While a straightforward interpretation regarding
identity is that, if a person is defined as above, then any change in any of those qualities
should require a revision of identity.
8

In Parfit 1995 he makes the distinction between Identifying Reductionism, Constitutive Reductionism,
and Eliminative Reductionism. His own position is one of Constitutive Reductionism, but I do not
believe this level of precision is required in making the comparison given in this paper.
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However, Parfit argues that this straightforward interpretation given above is not
the case. Diachronic personal identity is certainly possible – in cases where relation R
holds, it is normally caused, and where there is no branching9, we can meaningfully
talk about two persons at a temporal distance being numerically identical. Relation R
is defined as “psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with the
right kind of cause,” (Parfit 1984, p.262). Psychological connectedness is defined as
“the holding of particular direct psychological connections.” Psychological continuity
is defined as “the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness” where strong
connectedness requires “at least half the number that hold, over every day, in the lives
of nearly every actual person,” (Parfit 1984, p. 206).
Direct psychological connections between temporally disparate people can include
memories of experiences, intentions, values, ambitions, desires – nearly all of the ways
in which our psychological facts can be described. Myself today and tomorrow have
very strong connectedness – I can remember the experience of typing this sentence, I
still value compassion and attempt to cultivate it. All of these are psychological features
that can be directly connected to my immediate past or immediate future self. In Parfit
1984, his Reductionist view also requires physical continuity, though the focus even
there is the brain. In Parfit 2012, for example, he defines his view of personal identity
as follows.
The Narrow, Brain-Based Psychological Criterion States: If some future person would be
uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and this continuity would have
its normal cause, enough of the same brain, this person would be me. If some future person
would neither be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, nor have
enough of the same brain, this person would not be me. In all other cases, there would be
no answer to the question whether some future person would be me. But there would be
nothing that we did not know. (Parfit 2012, 6-7)

To translate Parfit’s terminology into the schema used earlier, his view of personal
identity can be given as follows.
Parfitian Psychological Continuity Personal Identity: For all times t, person P at t1 is one
and the same person as person Q at t2 if and only if for both P at t1 and Q at t2, psychological
continuity obtains and is caused normally, by enough of the same brain in each case.

Notice that this definition of personal identity has both a psychological component
(the psychological contiguity) as well as a physical component (enough of the same
brain). However, in this paper he ends up arguing that, as a matter of personal ontology,
we are embodied parts – in other words, “the conscious, thinking, and controlling parts
of human beings,” (Parfit 2012, p. 14). This is a revision of the views discussed above
9

The term “branching” used here refers to cases where there might be multiple entities that have
psychological continuity with me. For example, if I were to step into Parfit’s teletransporter and not one,
but two copies of me pop out on Mars, then it seems my psychological continuity has branched to those
two replica individuals. Sometimes, instead of the phrase “no branching” added into definitions of
psychological continuity, a “no duplicates” clause is added for the same purpose.
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and expressed in Parfit 1984. In the final version of the view, we are some physical
particulars with certain mental characteristics, and we are judged to be the same
through time on the basis of Relation R, normally caused, with enough of our brain
preserved, as discussed above.
A final point regarding Parfit’s view is the conclusion he comes to regarding the
importance of personal identity. Survival of something similar to my self is important,
but personal identity itself is not. This is because, as he writes in Parfit 1984 and Parfit
1995, the facts about our identity are reducible to other facts about physical and
psychological continuity. But even in the absence of strict identity conditions I might
be able to ascertain, the facts we most care about with still be relevant. If there is some
confusion about whether the Replica from the teletransporter will be me, or only a
Replica, what is not a matter of confusion is that a person, very similar to me in certain
specific ways, will continue to exist and have the kinds of experiences I value, the kinds
of psychological . And whether that entity is me or not seems, according to Parfit, a
fact about language and not about reality, about concepts and not ontology (Parfit 1995,
p. 40-41). Whether I can refer to some future person as being me or not, what is
important is that it bear Relation R to my present self. There is also some striking
language that suggests that, while it does not preserve identity, our social relations are
among the things that we care about continuing, on Parfit’s view. He writes
What we value, in ourselves and others, is not the continued existence of the same
particular brains and bodies. What we value are the various relations between ourselves
and others, whom and what we love, our ambitions, achievements, commitments, emotions,
memories, and several other psychological features. (Parfit 1984, 284, emphasis mine)

4. APPLICATION OF THE VIEWS TO EXAMPLE CASES
How do the views of Kong Zi and Parfit make judgements in the example cases we
developed above? In this section, I examine these four cases from both perspectives to
see where the accounts coincide in judgment, and where they differ.
First, take John’s case. On Parfit’s view, John is likely to be the same person for
most of his life. It is plausible that, at some point in the development of the Alzheimer’s
disease, John is no longer the same person due to the lack of psychological continuity
with his earlier self. Despite this, for most of his lifetime, his identity is fairly stable.
On a Parfitian view, John exists as the same person until far into the Alzheimer’s
diagnosis. The Confucian view is not so simple. When John gets married, he becomes
a different person, and when his wife dies, he becomes a different person. Similarly,
when he can no longer play the role of the father, and certainly when his son severs
their relationship, he becomes a different person yet again. While there are stretches
of time when John’s personal identity is the same on both accounts (for example, the
long stretch of John’s life where he is psychologically continuous with his earlier self
and is the husband and father), there are also some key disagreements.
Second, take Isabella’s case. Here is another case where the accounts give different
judgments at times, and similar judgments at others. While much of Isabella’s life has
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a kind of psychological continuity, the spiritual transformation and development
suggests a significant break, at least at some point. As she gets older and finds it
increasingly difficult to either empathize with or even understand the motivations and
values of her younger self, there is a great deal less psychological continuity there.
Proponents of psychological continuity theories may object here, but I would argue that
cases like this are not about qualitative or characteristic questions of personal identity.
It is true that we commonly speak of this same person as having gone through a
transformation, but where the psychological differences are so profound, there is reason
to think that there is a different person after the transformation, if not immediately then
at some further point down the line, due to the widespread change in motivations,
values, character traits, and beliefs. It is also true that people who undergo such
transformative experiences often say things like “That person (the past version) is dead,”
or “I am born again” or other phrases that suggest that they take seriously the idea of a
separateness and foreignness of their earlier selves. The Confucian view also suggests
a kind of change at around the same time. Depending on the specifics of Isabella’s
relationship with her mother in her youth, we may classify her as either a bad daughter,
or as so poor as to not be a daughter at all. At some point after her spiritual
transformation and her self-conscious repairing and strengthening her relationship with
her mother, the role she inhabits as Gladys’ daughter comes to define her life more
strongly. The last portion of her life we know about also suggests some different
judgments between the views. If Isabella’s personal identity changes when she
becomes a filial daughter to her mother, then it must also change when her mother
passes away, since that relationship and that role are no longer existent. Yet on my
construal of the Parfitian view, the life after her transformation is of a piece, hangs
together in a unified way, and is the same personal identity despite losing her mother.
Mohsen’s case provides another way to cash out the distinct judgments of personal
identity generated by the two views. As the case is described, there is good reason to
think that Mohsen maintains the same personal identity throughout his life on the
psychological continuity view. At no time in his life does he suffer a significant break
in psychological continuity, either through disease, injury, or transformative experience.
On the other hand, the Confucian account would identify a number of changes to
Mohsen’s personal identity. He is a son until disowned at 18, and inhabits a specific
husband role at some times and the dissolution of that role at others. If we take
seriously that these monogamous relationships were not simply transient, shallow
engagements, then we should take seriously that Mohsen’s personal identity changes
each time he is married, and each time he is divorced. We also know that one major
relationship, the one with his father, never seems to recover on either side. This
provides us yet another way to cash out the different views and the results they might
have in different cases.
Our final example case, of Ziwei, is clearer on one view and muddier on the other.
In terms of her psychological continuity it is clear that Ziwei’s personal identity
changes at 17, and again at 29. It is plausible to think that Ziwei was the same person
once her memory returns, but that there is a gap in her personal identity during the time
she suffers retrograde and anterograde amnesia. On the Parfitian view, this judgment
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can be made despite some slight blurriness in boundaries. The Confucian view is
harder to pin down, but I would argue that Ziwei largely remains the same person over
the time period of her memory gap, before it, and after it. Her parents take their roles
seriously and care for her as parents ought to care for children, and whenever Ziwei is
reminded she strives to understand herself as their daughter and act filially towards
them, despite having to be reminded of this over and over. This is a tricky case, but
distinct from cases where a family member is in a persistent vegetative state or is
otherwise unable to perform their familial role in any capacity, since Ziwei can and
does act filialy, when she is reminded. If this interpretation is correct, Ziwei’s case
gives us yet another instance where the two accounts diverge in unexpected ways.
5. THE SIMILARITIES (INEXACT) BETWEEN THE VIEWS
Having reviewed both of these theories of the self, it should be immediately obvious
that there are a host of differences between the two views. One is concerned with
psychological features naturally thought to be internal to oneself, while the other deals
with social roles and relationships which by their very nature are extrinsic and relational.
One view was advanced several thousand years ago, and the other is less than a hundred
years old (in its specifics). There are other differences, but for my own purposes, I am
interested in demonstrating how these two radically different views are quite similar in
certain respects.10
Both the Confucian conception of the self existing through time and Parfit’s
conception of the self as existing through time involve relations. For Kong Zi and the
Confucians, the relations that matter between selves are social relations and roles. In
determining what a person is we must examine the existence and the quality of their
identity-constituting relationships, the traditional early Confucian tradition’s five
relationships. When those relationships change or cease to exist, so too has the person
either changed or ceased to exist. For Parfit, the relation between selves of identity
(when applicable) and of survival is one of the degree of Relation R, caused in the right
way and by enough of the same brain. The greater degree of Relation R that holds
between me and another person (perhaps my future self), the more I have at stake in
their condition. At any given moment, I have the strongest Relation R to my current
self. But as time passes, the degree of my (current) psychological connectedness to a
future self (or far enough past self) becomes lesser and lesser (so too with the degree
of psychological continuity).11 So in the case of both Confucianism and Parfit, relations
10

While I do not have an explicit, considered view on the appropriate methodology for comparative
philosophy, I have found Mou 2010 and 2015 to be helpful in thinking about comparative philosophy
methodology. As general descriptions of the enterprise, see Wong 2020 (especially in relation to Chinese
– Western comparative philosophy) and Littlejohn 2021. For an argument critical of the common
cultural focus in comparative philosophy, see Weber 2013 and 2014.
11
Though I use the term “future self” here, though I do not mean it to be begging the question – clearly
if some person is my “self”, then it seems they are, by definition, me. I use this language provisionally,
and for ease of communicating the right concept, but in cases where personal identity fails to hold, then
the provisionally termed “future self” would instead be something like “future person that bears a
significant relation to me, but is not identical with me” or something similar. Talk of future or successive

Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)

BYER

15

are what matter when we think about personal identity and ontology, though they are
not the only thing that matters.
Note also that in each of the views, the person need not essentially be a substance.
That is not to say that the person need not be realized or instantiated by something –
only that this feature is not essential or central to either view of the person. For
Confucians, given that the person is simply made up of distinct, particular relationships
and social roles, the person simply is a different type of entity than a substance. For
Parfit, though the person is a particular physical thing or things, as stated in Parfit 2012
in his description of the embodied parts view, the feature essential to our personal
ontology and identity is the activity of thinking, and the thing that matters about our
identity or survival (where either do matter) is relational and processual, focusing
specifically on sets of physical and psychological features and psychological
connections between past, current, and future selves, as well as other relations as he
discusses. Notice that, for Parfit, while it doesn’t matter if a future entity is me, what
matters are these psychological characteristics and relations, and those things require
primarily a certain kind of capacity for thought, emotion, and other complex cognitive
and affective states. A future being that has none of these things, nor the capacity for
them, would certainly not be something worth valuing, even if some part that was
previously a thinking part, survived.
Finally, I believe that, in different ways, both views suggest that something like the
following thesis: identity through time is actually not what is important about persons
existing through time. In fact, I think this is the most important shared feature. For
Kong Zi and his followers, what matters are one’s social relations and roles, and their
quality – the fact that once I am no longer my father’s son or my (ex)wife’s husband
changes my identity and I am no longer the same person, but if these events are
important (and they undoubtedly are) it is not because they require personal identity
through time. What matters is the set of relations between my current self and other
people. Similarly, for Parfit personal identity not ultimately what matters to the features
of personal survival that we care about. We care about our future selves because they
share a certain degree of psychological connectedness to us (our current self). What is
valuable about these future persons is not that they are identical with us now, but that
we share this important relation to some degree or another.
6. WHY DOES THIS (COMPARISON) MATTER?
Thus far, this paper has attempted to give accurate accounts of both the Confucian self
and Parfit’s view of the self. Further, I have shown that in certain ways, Confucianism
and Parfit’s view are similar. In this section of the paper, I give two distinct reasons
why making this comparison is a fruitful and beneficial philosophical exercise.
A major advantage of the comparison argued for in this paper is its novelty. So far
as I can tell, no one in the professional literature has made any detailed and explicit
selves seems to me to capture more easily and concisely what is meant here, but I do not intend it to
presuppose an answer to the question or carry any important argumentative baggage.
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comparison between Parfit’s work on personal identity and the Confucian view of the
self.12 There are a number of papers that compare the Confucian conception of the self
with other Eastern and Western philosophical traditions (such as Bockover 2010a and
2010b, Ho 1995, Raphals 2009, and Yao 1996). Similarly, comparing Parfit to other
historical philosophers, especially David Hume and the Buddha, has been a popular
scholarly enterprise (such as in Ellis 2000, Gilead 2008, Lowe 1991, Margolis 1988,
Stone 1988, and Velleman 2006).13 But as far as I have been able to determine, no one
has made the kind of extended and detailed comparison between the Confucian view
of the self and Parfit’s view of the self that occurs in this paper.
A second advantage of this approach comes in using the tools of Parfit to
supplement this Confucian view of self, and vice versa. One can model a Confucian
response to concern about “future you” in the same way that Parfit models the concern
about future selves. In the case of Parfit, what I really care about is that some set of
psychological relations (in particular, psychological connectedness, what Parfit refers
to as relation R) of a high degree holds between my current and future selves. That is
what I care about – that this future person will have a great degree of similarity to me
with respect of my memories, desires, values, ambitions, etc (and perhaps have new
experiences and engage in new actions related to these psychological states, including
values). In the same way, I might (from a Confucian point of view) hold that what I
care about in terms of successive selves is that the future person I will become maintain
as much of the set of personal relations and roles that I play, to a high degree, and of a
high quality (call this relation S). That is what I want for some future self more than
identity – that this future person will still be a good brother, student, teacher, mentor,
not in general but with regard to concrete, specific individuals that I stand in these
relations and roles to and with (and ideally open up new, high quality relationships with
others). I am not presupposing that a Confucian that has grown up in this tradition
would even feel a need for or attraction to any of this offered above – but for someone,
especially a Westerner, that may have come to Confucianism later, this parallel can be
very attractive. I think, too, that the insights developed by Kong Zi and his modern-day
interpreters has significant value for Parfit’s own project, although I have not developed
these insights to any great detail. A realization of the import of social roles and
relationships in constituting the self might make a Parfitian view warmer and more
human.
In examining the advantages of the comparative project developed in the early part
of the paper, it is clear that a kind of hybrid account, incorporating the insights of the
psychological continuity theorist, Derek Parfit, and Kong Zi can be philosophically rich,
complex, and fruitful. I now turn to developing this account in some more detail.
12

Raphals 2009 mentions Parfit’s view at the end of her piece, but she compares this to Daoist views,
not Confucian ones, and the comparison is extremely brief.
13
Parfit himself does this with respect to the Buddha, sometimes comparing and sometimes contrasting,
in Parfit 1984 and 1995. Giles 1993 mentions in a footnote Parfit’s confusing the Buddha’s view as a
kind of reductionism, which the later Parfit seems to have noted. In addition, Trycyle magazine posted
an article about Tibetan Buddhist monks utilizing Parfit 1984 in their religious and scholarly practices,
in “Tibetan Monks Found” 2011.
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Though I will develop this account and consider some objections in the final sections
of this paper, there are still a number of fruitful, comparative issues and approaches to
explore in this general region.14,15
7. THE HYBRID ACCOUNT
I propose a hybrid account of personal identity and ontology given below.
Hybrid Confucian/Parfitian Account of Diachronic Personal Identity: For all times
t, person P at t1 is one and the same person as person Q at t2 if and only if
i. for both P at t1 and Q at t2, psychological continuity obtains and is caused normally, by
enough of the same brain in each case, and
ii. P at t1 is constituted by the same specific social roles R that constitute Q at t2, and such
roles are inspired by the works of early Confucians and the rites of the early Confucian
tradition.

This way of spelling out the hybrid account gives equal weight and importance to
both social roles and relations, and psychological continuity, each of which seem to be
particularly important to our understanding of our own personal identity and that of
others.
This way of spelling out the view on personal identity also comports with the case
made above that our Parfitian intuitions about both my psychological traits and
capacities distinctive to me are central to my being the same person, and our Confucian
intuitions about the roles and relations I inhabit are central to my being the same person.
What about personal ontology? Recall that, for Parfit, we are the thinking parts of
human beings. For Kong Zi, we are constituted by social roles and relations. I propose
we treat the hybrid view of personal ontology as follows.
Hybrid Confucian/Parfitian Account of Personal Ontology: A person is a complex
object constituted both by component a.) a set of social roles and relationships, and
component b.) the thinking parts of human animals. These are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for any entity to count as a person.
As with the hybrid view of personal identity, this hybrid view of personal ontology
keeps our insights about the importance for both our nature as thinking creatures, and
our nature as deeply social creatures, for us to count as persons at all.
14

An additional fertile area might be in applying some other contemporary Western analytic metaphysics
literature to the Confucian conception of the self. In conversation, Andrew Russo has proposed that
what might be called The Relational Animal Problem, which is structurally similar to Erik Olson’s
Thinking Animal Problem (Olson 2007), and this could be developed as an interesting puzzle for the
Confucian view.
15
In particular, Eileen Nutting brought to my attention how much the Confucian view might complicate
matters of self-definition with respect to others when those others’ relations change (e.g. if my sister has
a child and becomes a mother, my roles relative to her change and include new items precisely by her
other relationships and roles changing).
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This view is certainly not straightforward, since it requires us to think of persons as
pretty complicated kinds of things – not simply substances, or parts of substances, or
sets, but some mereological object that is constituted by both a set of relations and roles
and by some substantial parts of a larger object. This is not terribly surprising as far as
philosophy, or views on personal identity, go. Clauses about simplicity or parsimony
are always ceteris paribus, or “all other things being equal.” If I am right about the
relative insights and import for both the Confucian view and the Parfitian view as
discussed, then a hybrid view will inherit both of these kinds of advantages from its
component views. As a view it will discount neither the importance of the
psychological dimension of us as persons, nor will it discount the importance of the
social dimension of us as persons. Each view on its own leaves some important part of
our personhood unrecognized or diminished. The hybrid view does not.
Finally, I think that (as discussed in the previous section), we can spell out a similar
insight into what really matters on this hybrid view.
Hybrid Confucian/Parfitian Insight about Personal Identity: Personal identity is
not what we care about in terms of our survival (or the survival of something that
once was us). What we really care about in terms of survival is both
i. The degree to which the future self is similar to us in our psychological relations
(relation R), and
ii. The degree to which the future self is similar to us in our social roles and relations, and
their quality (relation S).

In this case, the hybrid view helps diminish some of our illusory concerns about
personal identity. Whether I am identical in a strict, numerical sense with some future
person is less important than that the future person who survives has much of my
psychological and evaluative makeup. Similarly, whether I am identical in a strict,
numerical sense with some future person is less important than that the future person
who survives continues inhabiting the social roles and maintaining the social relations
I treasure and treat as constitutive to my personhood. A future person (who bears some
intimate, but non-identity preserving relationship to me) who is similar to me in terms
of my Relation R and Relation S will still be a source of joy, happiness, and perhaps
even pride for me. A future person who departs much more strongly will be harder for
me to appraise or evaluate, whether positively or negatively, depending on the specifics
of the situation. If the future person has become a much more knowledgeable,
sympathetic, and moral person, and have expanded their relationships and improved
their quality, including doing a better job of inhabiting those roles important to me, I
am likely to be happy for, though also a bit jealous of, that person. If a future person
has significantly deteriorated, has become more immoral and more foolish, more selfish
and turned inward, abandoned social roles of import to me and damaged or cut off the
specific relationships I once prized so strongly, I am likely to feel sorrow and anger
towards that person. But in neither case does this turn on my identity with that person,
but with the quality and similarity of their psychological continuity with me as well as
the quality and similarity of their relational continuity with me.
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To further flesh out the view, I now turn to some questions about and objections to
this proposal. This will allow me to spell out the view in more detail, head off any
misinterpretations, and respond to some objections.
8. QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, OBJECTIONS, AND REPONSES
Question: What relationships ought to be included in the hybrid view, and what is their
relative importance?
Answer: I would argue that at least four of the five relationships (discounting the
ruler-subject relationship) from the early Confucian view are the ones most important
for this process, though as I said earlier, these should be construed loosely, insofar as
the exact duties and obligations of friends to friends, or parents to children, is the
subject of some significant cultural and temporal difference. As a reminder, these are
the relationships of parent-child, serious romantic partners, elder-singling-younger
sibling, and friends. Other relationships can matter, but unless they are functionally
more similar to one of the five relationships than any of the actual five relationships
had by a person, they will be less important, and have less to contribute, to one’s
personal identity and ontology. For example, a person who has a very poor home life,
where the parents do not care well for the child, neglects their physical and emotional
well-being, and often fails to do even formal parenting duties (e.g. sign off on field
trips, make sure there is food in the house for the children, attend parent-teacher
conferences, etc.) may have someone else, such as a teacher, a religious figure, or even
an extended family member play the role of parent much better, and provide the kind
of parental relationship that, in terms of its functional import, accurately characterizes
the parent relationship as opposed to the child’s actual parents. This is not much
different than the case of an abandoned child who is adopted, or the case where a close
friend plays a role closer to a sibling for an only child, or who plays both roles of friend
and older sibling.
In fact, we see this occur in a variety of different ways. A young person who is
disowned by their genetic family for whatever reason (occupational choice, religion or
irreligion, sexual orientations, gender identity, etc.) often finds other people to inhabit
the important parent and sibling-like roles in their lives. It is not uncommon for
individuals that comes from broken homes and toxic families to say things like “My
friends are my real family,” or similar phrases because those individuals did and still
do play those important functional roles. If a young child grows up without a mother,
an aunt, a family friend, or a grandmother sometimes plays that functional role instead.
If a person has a hard time making friends, the may treat a sibling or a romantic partner
as they would a close friend, and that person may play both roles for them.
This is not to say that this answer, or my proposed treatment, is not controversial,
but only that the importance of these Confucian relationships for our personal and
moral developments have strong grounding for their relative significance as compared
to other kinds of relationships we might try to pick out. And often, when we do pick
out nonstandard relationships for their importance, it is because they fulfill the
functional role of one of these Confucian relationships.
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More specifically, the answer must be that this is an empirical matter. The
relationships one has as they are growing up are of fundamental importance to one’s
personal identity, and there is increasing psychological, sociological, and philosophical
evidence of the importance of these relationships (parent-child, sibling, romantic
partner, and friends), not only in terms of one’s overall well-being, but in one’s personal
development, psychological development, and personal character. I am confident that
these relationships, or their functional equivalents in cases where the exact relationship
either fails to exist or fails to have a minimal nature, are of the utmost importance for
our personal identity and ontology, and I have tried to make that case here.
Question: Isn’t the Confucian view basically a narrative account of personal
identity? And insofar as the hybrid view includes the Confucian elements, isn’t the
hybrid view also just basically a narrative account of personal identity?
Answer: Narrative accounts of personal identity hold that a person is who they are
not merely because of some minimal set of psychological conditions, but because they
tell themselves a story or many related stories about their life, see themselves
autobiographically as the central figure or protagonist of their story or stories, and
develop in concord with that story or those stories. There are a number of authors
identified with narrative accounts,16 but the one I will focus on the most is the view
developed by Marya Schechtman.17 The initial discussion of narrative theories focus
on the kind of narrative theory found in Schechtman’s earlier work, and the second
discussion of narrative theory will focus on Schechtman’s later work. Narrative
accounts of personal identity all hold something like the following claim, insofar as
they attempt to answer the persistence question and not the characterization question.
Narrative Account of Diachronic Personal Identity: For all times t, person P at t1 is
one and the same person as person Q at t2 if and only if
i. for both P at t1 and Q at t2, either P at t1 has a narrative that identifies P and Q, or Q at
t2 has a narrative that identifies P and Q, and
ii. the narrative is identity-constituting, and
iii. the narrative is dispositional (in other words, a person could articulate their narrative
if pressed), and
iv. the narrative is consistent with the objective facts relevant to the narrative.

Let’s unpack some of these claims. Part I of the account is the relevant part of the
account that discusses narratives as identifying individuals at different times. This is
part of what makes this kind of account focused on the persistence question, and not
the characterization question. A person-constituting narrative is a narrative that
includes seeing oneself as being in time and/or moving through time, as well as
knowledge of one’s past and how this is connected to one’s present and potentially
16

Other important contributions to the literature on the narrative account of personal identity (or
accounts that have been influential in later developments) include Korsgaard 1989, MacIntyre 1981,
Rudd 2005 and 2007, and Schroer and Schroer 2014. For some critiques of this family of views, see
Strawson 2004 and Olson and Witt 2018.
17
In particular, the accounts given in Schechtman 1996, 2009, and 2017.
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one’s future. This identity constituting narrative also requires that we are not merely
passive recipients of our story, but active shapers and contributors of the story of our
life.
The last two features, iii and iv, of the narrative account, are also called the
articulation constraint (iii) and the reality constraint (iv). The articulation constraint
requires that one at least be able, in principle, to articulate the major features of one’s
narrative if asked. Few people see themselves or their lives as explicitly being a story
they are the author of, so a narrative account that required that people consciously and
explicitly understand their lives as stories would be too high a bar. The articulation
constraint only requires that a person be able to discuss their narrative if prompted, with
reflection. The reality constraint is meant to ensure that not just any narrative will be
fair game. If I tell a grand narrative where I am an alien come to Earth to spy on the
Earthlings, this will not be an identity-constituting narrative since it will run afoul of
many objective facts: the fact that I have human DNA, was born of a human woman,
have never been to outer space, have no connections to any aliens, the uncertainty of
aliens existing, or if they do exist, the uncertainty surrounding if they were even able
to travel to Earth, etc. This will be true for any number of potential narratives and
ensures that the narrative account does not license anyone to tell just any story about
themselves and for it to count as true.
It should be clear, given the foregoing discuss of the narrative view of personal
identity that there are some similarities. For example, the self-constituting narrative of
my life is likely to include other people. My story is not very interesting without my
parents, sibling, good friends, and romantic partners. Further, as Schechtman notes, our
capacity to develop a narrative and tell stories about ourselves and others is itself the
product of social development. No one comes into the world a full-blown narrator of
their own life or experience. We learn to tell the story of our self by observing the
stories others tell, and by trying on different narrative roles at different times, often
explicitly in conjunction with our parents, siblings, and friends. There is also a
similarity between roles one might assign or play in a narrative and the roles one might
inhabit on the Confucian view. Insofar as a major part of my story is being a son, then
it appears that the social role of “son” will be a major part of my narrative. So there is
certainly some overlap between the two views given the importance familial and other
roles and relationships might play in our narrative.
Despite these similarities, there are important differences. My occupying a role is
not always a matter of it relating to a story or narrative, and whether I play the role well
has little to do with the story I tell, and much more to do with objective states of affairs
such as my attainment of a virtue or lack thereof, or whether my father is dead or not.
Further, the reality constraint is too vague to serve the purpose in the Confucian view
of the person as the doctrine of the rectification of names. A person’s biological father
will be their biological father regardless of the story they tell, since it is consistent with
the objective facts. Contrast this with the functional account appealed to above
regarding the robustness of certain familial and other roles. Finally, on this initial
narrative view, I could tell a story consistent with objective facts in such a way that my
roles no longer apply to me, without any input from others, and in the Confucian view,

Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)

BYER

22

social roles require the function, acknowledgement, and input of both parties – it is a
relational view, not a narrative view of persons.
On Schechtman’s later view, the social aspect of narratives is given a greater
importance. 18 This kind of development of a social narrative could be one way to
respond to the charge above about narrative’s being too individual, and not sufficiently
socially grounded. Though her earlier view recognized this feature, the later view
makes explicit the importance of others. In fact, the stories others tell about us, on this
modified narrative view, can establish our identity even without any narrative given by
us.
This social narrative account of personal identity could be specified as follows.
Social Narrative Account of Diachronic Personal Identity: For all times t, person P
at t1 is one and the same person as person Q at t2 if and only if
i. for both P at t1 and Q at t2, either P at t1 or some other relevantly placed person has a
narrative that identifies P and Q, or Q at t2 or some other relevantly placed person has a
narrative that identifies P and Q, and
ii. the narrative is identity-constituting, and
iii. the narrative is dispositional (in other words, a person could articulate their narrative
if pressed), and
iv. the narrative is consistent with the objective facts relevant to the narrative.

The social narrative account holds that in many cases, our narratives are driven by
others and begin before we can develop any narrative, implicit or otherwise. Consider
the following story. A child is born too early to poor parents and must be flown to a
better equipped and more expensive hospital. The premature child must be kept in a
special incubator, be given nourishment with a tube, and must receive significant
medical care to ensure the child’s survival. The parents may begin this child’s narrative
with how much of a fighter they are, and how despite their hardships they were
determined to live. This then becomes a story repeated to others that care about the
family and the child, and these relevantly placed persons accept this account as the
beginning of the child’s story. Further, once the child is grown, this part of the narrative
is incorporated into the child’s own story. This story is not uncommon and is very likely
to capture what is meant in the social narrative account provided by Schechtman in
Schechtman 2017. It also allows the narrative theorist to rebut the complaints raised
earlier about the initial narrative accounts not being sufficiently social.
A quick word about the phrase “relevantly placed persons.” Not every individual
who might tell a narrative about someone can contribute to their narrative. I might tell
a fabulous story about the secret lives of the other people in line at the grocery store,
but it is implausible to think that I am thereby developing their narrative. On the other
hand, the narrative a mother, or other sibling tells about a newborn child, is more likely
to count as a development of that individual’s narrative. I take the phrase “relevantly
18

A similar view, though different in some respects, is Hilde Lindemann’s social constructionist view
of persons, as described in Lindemann 2002 and 2014. In fact, Schechtman credits Lindemann’s work
with making her think more carefully about the social aspects of narrativity relating to personhood.
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placed persons” to mean those who are closely linked with an individual, in a familial
or personal relationship, that are likely to remain a presence in their lives barring any
accidents or emergencies. Schechtman does not use this term, but she makes it clear
that not just any narrative told by anyone else will count as an individual narrative –
the social context and depth of the relations will at least partly determine this.
Now the question initially asked seems even more relevant – doesn’t the Confucian
view just turn out to be a kind of social narrative account of personal identity? And,
insofar as the hybrid view requires this, doesn’t the hybrid view turn out to be a kind
of social narrative account of personal identity? And if this is true, doesn’t that reduce
the novelty of this hybrid account?
The similarities between a social narrative account and a Confucian account as
outlined do seem even stronger. Now, in addition to the stories told on the narrative
account containing important social roles and relations, the process of narrative
building becomes more collaborative on this view, in the same way that relationships
and relational roles turn out to be collaborative on the Confucian view. The earlier
response will not be entirely sufficient to demonstrate the gap between Confucian and
narrative accounts if the focus is on social narrative accounts of personal identity.
However, there is a tension in the social narrative account that does not exist in the
Confucian role-person account, and the social narrative account is committed to some
claims not consistent with the Confucian account of personal identity.
First, it is difficult to see how the social narrative account can maintain the reality
constraint. Consider again the description of the premature baby as being inherently a
fighter, determined to live. It is possible that this is true to the objective facts in some
sense, but a premature child may survive despite their possessing nothing like the trait
of a fighter whatsoever, but due to good medical care or the vagaries of chance. Many
stories about children begin this way; that ever since the child did some picturesque
thing shortly after birth, or because the child kicked in a specific way when the mother
was listening to a specific musical artist, it becomes part of some central narrative about
the child’s overall character, life, and a near-destiny to be achieved. The issue isn’t
simply that the parent might be wrong, but that the temptation to read back into these
past incidents things that confirm something about the child’s character later is likely
to be indifferent to the objective facts. The Confucian view is not subject to this
weakness, since social roles and relations are much thicker concepts that require a great
deal more than narrative, whether from oneself or someone else.
Second, the social narrative view developed in Schechtman 2017 holds that
narrative accounts of others can be defining for a person despite the ability of a person
to develop or construe their own life as a narrative in any way. Drawing on a story told
by Hilde Lindemann, Schechtman’s work here is focused on classifying severely
developmentally disabled family members, people who deteriorate greatly later in life,
or even short-lived infants with debilitating illnesses as persons given the way others
might constitute their narratives for them, and the role that they play in the narratives
of others. For the Confucian view, as I’ve developed it in this paper, some of these
things are simply not possible due to the gap between a social role and relationship’s
functional requirements and a narrative given by another. It is a terrible tragedy to
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miscarry a child for all family members involved, but the child was never in a position
to embrace or reject any familial role at all. Similarly, if we take seriously the
rectification of names doctrine, then a human who is simply unable to play any of the
previously discussed specified roles or develop any significant social relationships, will
simply not turn out to be a person. And this is also true of the hybrid view, insofar as it
requires the Confucian social role and relationship conditions.
None of this is an argument that the Confucian view is true and that the social
narrative view is false. The reasons throughout this section are given to explain the
similarities and differences between the Confucian relational view of personal identity
and the narrative view of personal identity. It should be clear that the Confucian view
is not simply a narrative view under another name.
Question: Since the hybrid view requires that both the Parfitian condition and the
Confucian condition to be met (in the personal identity component, the personal
ontology component, and the insight about the unimportance of identity component),
what is the relative priority between the conditions? Is each of equal weight? Is one
more fundamental than the other?
Answer: In terms of logical priority, each are equally weighted in terms of personal
identity, ontology, and the insight about the unimportance of identity and what is
important in survival. On the hybrid view of personal identity, ontology, and the insight
about what is important in survival, each condition is individually necessary and the
conditions together are jointly sufficient.
However, the details are a bit trickier in thinking about personal ontology. While
each component might be individually necessary and jointly sufficient, they seem to
rely on one another in different ways for their formation and development. It is clear
that, in order to inhabit the social roles that contribute to one’s personal identity and
ontology, one must already be a kind of entity capable of some specific psychological
states and characteristics. Without these features, it is hard to see how a person could
become a parent or friend to another, or to maintain and contribute to the growth and
development of their relationships. In this way, it seems that there is a kind of
developmental, if not logical or ontological, priority regarding the idea that we are the
thinking parts of human beings.
On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence that socialization at specific
stages is incredibly important in the development of our brain, our personality, and our
psychological capacities. When children are not provided adequate socialization at
early stages, they lose the capacity to use spoken language, to reason abstractly, and in
some cases to empathize with others, all of which are significant characteristics of us
as being the thinking parts of human beings. In some cases, it appears that if these
capacities are not nourished through socialization, they may be lost forever. This
provides us evidence that socialization, including into the five relationships and the
appropriate roles inspired by Confucianism, also has some developmental priority over
at least some of our capacities as the thinking parts of human beings.
Perhaps, like the hybrid view itself, the best way to discuss the developmental
priority between the Confucian component of personal ontology and the Parfitian
component of personal ontology is to say that, depending on the specifics, these
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components at different times depend on each other for their full development and
expression. In any case, whether one component has developmental priority over the
other, the hybrid view asserts that taking each view seriously requires each component
to be individually necessary for personal ontology, and jointly sufficient for personal
ontology.
Objection: A hybrid view will fail because the two views will give different answers
to the same question – in particular, the Parfitian desire to be psychologically
continuous through time is at odds with the Confucian view of the importance of
psychological change and moral development in coming to inhabit various roles.
Answer: There is some truth to the claim that Parfit and Confucian are aiming at
different things in terms of their insight about the unimportance of identity. For Parfit,
I seem to want the future person to be similar to me, and so to preserve my
psychological continuity, warts and all, whereas the Confucian tradition of moral
development and a focus on getting closer and closer to achieving a significant moral
good, such as attaining goodness (ren 仁) or becoming a superior person (junzi 君子)19,
would require that I depart from my current psychological states and attributes. In other
words, one view is focused on conservation of previous attributes, while the other is
focused on improving oneself and thereby abandoning or growing beyond previous
attributes, which seems like trouble for a view combining these two approaches.
While this objection is on to something, I believe that we can understand the hybrid
account as an attempt to harmonize some disparities in the individual accounts, and I
also take it that the accounts can be construed so as to not be quite as discordant as
depicted above. While it is true that Parfit’s view of personal identity stresses
preservation of current attributes, it is also clear that what is being preserved are
specifically things of value in oneself. Nothing in Parfit’s view of personal identity or
what matters in survival rules out a project of self-improvement, and this is not
surprising given Parfit’s focus in other work on the importance of moral reasoning.
This is attested by the Parfit quote used earlier, that focuses on the importance of a
future person is focus on “who and what we love, our ambitions, achievements, and
commitments,” (Parfit 1984, p. 284). Surely these things could be preserved even in
cases of moral improvement and self-development, in the same way that my goal of
losing 20 pounds is preserved if I lose 40 pounds, or my goal of being a good basketball
player is preserved if I become a great basketball player. In other words, some changes
are greater departures than other changes, and it would be consistent with the Parfitian
view to allow for these positive changes of personal development.
Similarly, the Confucian tradition’s view of moral development is itself broadly
conservative. By this I mean that often the focus of moral development is to take
something we already innately possess and expand upon it, rather than adopting a new
19

There is a great deal of scholarly disagreement regarding how to translate both ren and junzi into
English, and the degree to which there are any precise words or philosophical concepts in English that
accurately match the two terms. I take no position on this here, and the English terms used are simply
meant as placeholders. The key point, here, is just that becoming a junzi and attaining ren, whatever their
exact nature, is something one strives for in the Confucian tradition, and so will require a willingness to
change and be improved over time.
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outlook or moral focus entirely. If our community and family have done their job, the
beginnings of our virtue are already something planted in us and developed throughout
our childhood. It is true that moral development requires change, but at least some of
this change is in filtering out the superficial, the self-interested, and the lazy from the
innate sprouts of goodness (duan 端) already in ourselves, and preserving the good
already there. While a Confucian view stresses moral improvement and change
consistent with that improvement, the kind of moral improvement the Confucian
tradition aims at has a significant element of preservation inherent to it.
All of this is to say that, while an initial appraisal of the two views would suggest
they necessarily conflict, I have shown that this picture is not so simple; there is room
for improvement and change in a Parfitian view, and the moral improvement consistent
with the Confucian view has elements of preservation of existing features in our
personhood. The two views do not conflict as neatly or as obviously as this objection
claims.
Objection: A hybrid view will fail because the two views are not concerned with
the same basic question. Parfit is concerned with both personal ontology and with
numerical diachronic identity over time. The Confucian view is not about either of
these items – it is about social relationships and the role these play in the story of our
life, and sit much more comfortably as being about the characterization question,
instead of the persistence question, of personal identity. Since the two positions are not
even attempting to answer the same question, a hybrid account will not make sense.
Answer: It is plausible to interpret the Confucian view as answering a different kind
of question than the Parfitian view, and some scholars do make clear that this is exactly
what they’re doing. On the other hand, it is also clear that some scholars take the
Confucian position to be a position about personal identity and ontology, and it is
appropriate to take these scholars at their word. Sauchelli devotes a chapter to this view
alongside psychological continuity views, narrative views, and animalist views, all
views concerned with the persistence question. Ames and Rosemont, in different works,
compare this view to the Cartesian substance dualist view, which is plausibly
interpreted as a view about persistence. Additionally, I have also shown that, despite
other ways the Confucian position on persons can be interpreted, it is possible to
interpret it as a position on personal identity and an answer to the persistence question.
So the hybrid view can use both of these approaches, since both can be seen as targeting
the same question about personal identity.
Objections: A hybrid view will fail because the two elements are in tension with
one another. On Parfit’s view, psychological essentialism is true – persons are
essentially psychological entities. This seems in conflict with the Confucian account of
persons as essentially relational entities.
Answer: While on the surface there may seem to be a conflict, this is resolved on a
more in-depth examination of the views. As I have argued, there are certain
preconditions to have thick relations and play the social roles inspired by or identical
with those given in the early Confucian tradition. Some of these preconditions
explicitly require that humans have certain psychological capacities and properties.
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Here are two such preconditions that require psychological capacities, directly or
indirectly.
First, a virtue-oriented account of Confucian ethics requires many of the same
features of a western virtue account, including motivation, accompanying emotion,
mental and emotional discipline and training to develop and maintain a virtue. Each of
these components require that humans have considerable psychological capacities
and/or properties. Insofar as these virtues are require to maintain and inhabit certain
relationships and roles, especially the five relationships in Confucianism, persons will
necessarily have a psychological dimension.
Second, the role of the heart-mind in Confucianism as a faculty of cognition and
self-reflection, uniting emotional and cognitive appraisal, gives us reason to think that
Confucians understood the importance of the psychological dimension of our lives as
persons. Insofar as the heart-mind plays a central role in the moral development of
Confucian persons, and a central role in how one inhabits these social roles and
maintains these important social relationships, persons will necessarily have a
psychological dimension.
If the reasons given here are sound, then there is no reason to think that the hybrid
view must fail due to this mis-fit in the characterization of persons.
Objection: The hybrid account falls prey to a dilemma – it is either too vague to
answer the persistence question of personal identity (since the underlying ontology of
persons will be unclear), or too uninteresting as an answer to the characterization
question of personal identity (because all it really says is something like “our
psychological states and social roles and relationships all matter greatly for who we
are”).
Answer: I have explained, in detail, what kind of thing persons would be in this
hybrid view in section 7 and in answer to an earlier question in section 8. I have also
explained why there is good reason to think that the Confucian view of personal identity
is not about the characterization question, but about the persistence question. Both
horns of the dilemma fail.
9. CONCLUSION
I have summarized the views of both the early Confucians and Derek Parfit. I have
demonstrated that there are a number of interesting similarities between the two views,
in spite of the fact that they are separated in time and space by such distance. I have
given two distinct reasons that support the philosophical value of this particular
comparative project. Finally, I have developed a hybridized theory combining the
insights of both Kong Zi and Parfit on personal identity and ontology, explained this
theory in detail by way of answering questions, and responded to several objections.
The hybrid view is a promising way to think about both personal identity and ontology,
and combines several important insights from each of these traditions. While more
work needs to be done to develop the view in further detail and consider other
objections, the author hopes that this is a sure-footed beginning of that path.
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